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Abstract 
The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum 
users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a 
consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, 
technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going 
spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use 
and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any 
framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for 
enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to 
protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, 
legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, 
overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement 
mechanisms may need to vary as well.  
In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms 
for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special 
attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider 
deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of 
how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the 
incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market 
scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access 
rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more 
efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The future of wireless necessitates that we use our Radio Frequency (RF) resources more 
efficiently, which in turn, requires us to transition to a future in which spectrum is shared 
more intensively. The growing demand pressure for expanded access for legacy and new 
uses and the need for significant spectrum reform to enable such sharing was noted by the 
FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force, was reaffirmed by the National Broadband Plan and the 
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President's call for an additional 500MHz of spectrum for mobile broadband, and most 
recently in the PCAST report on government spectrum.1 
Realizing the future where spectrum sharing is the norm requires us to commercialize next 
generation radio technologies such as Cognitive Radios (CRs) and Software Defined Radios 
(SDRs)2 to enable the Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA)3 systems needed to support higher 
utilization of our RF resources. These technologies enable new business models and 
spectrum sharing regimes that pose a host of opportunities and challenges for spectrum 
managers and the entire wireless ecosystem. For example, the FCC recognized the 
challenges posed by SDRs as early as 2000.4 As commercial and academic interest evolved 
from SDRs to DSA systems, the questions first raised by the FCC in 2000 -- some of which 
involved enforcement -- have become more complex. 
The enforcement challenges around SDRs were largely confined to ensuring compliance 
with radio certification requirements, but the enforcement challenges for DSA systems are 
more complex, including ensuring the rights of license holders under opportunistic sharing 
                                                 
1 See FCC (2002), FCC (2010), White Houe (2010), and PCAST (2012). 
2 Cognitive Radios (CRs) and Software Defined Radios (SDRs) are often referred to together and 
sometimes the terms may be used interchangeably. In this paper, we will follow that practice since 
the distinctions are not ones we focus on here, but they do have important implications for 
standardization and regulatory compliance. CRs distribute decision-making functionality into the 
radio access network, and ultimately to the handsets – allowing them to make operational decisions, 
including such functionality as sensing the RF environment for spectrum white spaces, controlling 
frequency selection, power, or other operating parameters/modes. In contrast, SDRs are an 
implementation technology, implementing in software what previously would have been 
implemented in radio hardware. As such, SDRs are a key enabling technology for CRs. For further 
discussion of how SDRs and CRs are distinct yet related, see 
http://www.wirelessinnovation.org/Defining_CR_and_DSA or Scoville et al. (2006).  
3 DSA, like SDRs and CRs, is another term that may be interpreted narrowly or broadly. In its narrow 
definition, DSA refers to the use of CR/SDR and related radio technologies to enable more dynamic 
(in time, space, and operating modes) management of RF spectrum. Used more broadly, DSA refers 
to the whole class of technologies, business models, and policies that enable spectrum resources to 
be shared more intensively across users, uses, and locations (where "locations" refers to the full 
dimensionality of the RF electrospace – in time, space, waveform, etcetera). In this paper, we will 
use DSA in both senses. It is the need to share spectrum more broadly that provides the principal 
economic driver for adopting novel radio technologies like CR/SDR but it is the special regulatory 
enforcement challenges and opportunities associated with these new radio technologies that are the 
principal focus of this paper.  
4 FCC In the Matter of: Inquiry regarding Software Defined Radios ET Docket 00-47, March 21, 2000. 
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(i.e., protection from "harmful interference"5), “fair” spectrum sharing among secondary 
users, primary and secondary user conformance with contracts, and detection of “free 
riders.” Faulhaber (2006) noted the importance of dispute resolution and enforcement, and 
in particular, with regard to cognitive radios, he wrote: 
The deployment of cognitive radio promises to be a nightmare for enforcement 
against interference in either a property regime or a commons regime. In most cases, 
a licensee will have but a few neighbors in frequency or geographic space and will 
have no difficulty discovering who is the cause of interference and then determining 
if the interferer is violating her license restrictions. With cognitive radio, the interferer 
can show up in any frequency band, briefly (but significantly) interfere, and then 
disappear undetectably. Enforcing restrictions on such fast-moving opportunistic 
interferers is virtually impossible; widespread abuse is likely to be the result, earning 
this technology the sobriquet ‘‘hit and run radio’’ 
Herein, we argue that such a prognosis is overly alarmist and narrow in its construction of 
what constitutes DSA, how it might be implemented (i.e., the specific sharing regime that is 
anticipated and the technologies and context used to realize that sharing regime), and what 
that in turn implies for the DSA enforcement challenge. In Weiss and Lehr (2009) we 
highlighted the diversity of cooperative and non-cooperative sharing regimes that already 
exist or may exist with more enlightened business and regulatory policies. In this richer world 
of DSA, we expect there to be multiple layers of enforcement that will mutually re-enforce 
each other, helping to protect spectrum users from the sort of "run amok" scenario 
anticipated by Faulhaber, and if properly approached, heralding a much brighter future for 
efficiency-enhancing novel radio technologies like CR/SDRs (Chapin & Lehr, 2007b). As we 
shall explain, different enforcement strategies are better for different types of DSA systems.  
This is not the first paper to consider enforcement in connection with DSA systems. Most 
notably, a series of papers by Sahai and his co-authors consider mechanisms to enforce 
sharing (Atia, Sahai & Saligrama, 2008; Harrison & Sahai, 2011; Tandra & Sahai, 2007, 
2008; or Woyach & Sahai, 2011). As with Faulhaber’s work, Sahai’s papers are focused on 
opportunistic sharing enabled by cognitive radios that actively sense and respond to their 
local environments, and the focus of enforcement in those papers is on mechanisms that 
are embedded in the CR technology.  
                                                 
5 The question of what constitutes "harmful" interference is an important question for spectrum 
management, and is explicit or implicitly defined by the property rights regime and its associated 
enforcement regime. In this paper we do not take a position on what should be the appropriate 
definition, and put it in quotes here to signal our recognition that this is an appropriately ambiguous 
and contentious term. 
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The emergent opportunities for spectrum sharing, however, are not limited to opportunistic 
sharing that depends on CRs. Instead, there is considerable commercial interest in the 
static spectrum holes of the TV White Spaces (TVWS) and cooperative forms of spectrum 
sharing, such as Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) contracts that have been a part of 
the mobile landscape for a number of years (Weiss, 2011). The enforcement of such 
regimes will depend, in part on the technology, but also importantly on the business 
models/practices, market conditions, and regulatory rules and institutional frameworks in 
which the DSA takes place. The evolution of this ecosystem will require changes in the 
technology, but also in business models, markets and policy frameworks – and those 
changes will induce feedback and learning. Experience and trust built in one mode of DSA 
sharing will contribute to building trust and experience for other modes; progress toward 
establishing business contracting norms for cooperative sharing (even in static spectrum 
environments) will contribute to building trust for more dynamic CR-enabled forms of sharing. 
Lower transaction costs for legal remedies for enforcement will complement and re-enforce 
CR-enabled enforcement techniques, and visa versa. Thus, we conclude it is important to 
consider enforcement in a broader sense with respect to DSA-based systems. 
The purpose of this paper is to construct such a broader framework for evaluating 
enforcement under various modes of spectrum sharing. This will involve extending 
Faulhaber’s and Sahai’s work through the application of principles from the law and 
economics literature. We accomplish this by first discussing the general aspects of 
enforcement. From our analysis, we conclude that 
 A single, generic enforcement regime is unlikely to emerge for DSA systems because 
of the large diversity of rights regimes and operational ecosystems (i.e., business, 
market, regulatory and technology environments);  
 An enforcement regime that is adaptive and responsive to learning as these 
ecosystems emerge, evolve and mature is important to the ultimate success of DSA 
systems; 
2 GENERAL ASPECTS OF ENFORCEMENT 
According to Merriam-Webster, there are five definitions of “enforce” (Enforce, 2012). (1) to 
give force to, (2) to urge with energy, (3) constrain, compel, (4) obsolete, and (5) to carry out 
effectively. From the point of view of law and economics, enforcement makes regulation 
(laws, agency rules) and contracts (voluntary ex ante commitments governing post-
contracting behavior) effective.  
Indeed, as Demsetz (1964) points out, enforcement is a key component of any property 
rights regime. Property rights are a social construct necessitated by our desire to separate 
ownership and decision-making (as a consequence of economic specialization). Property 
rights facilitate the coordination of action across parties by specifying what usage and 
decision-making rights and responsibilities different economic actors have with respect to 
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goods and services exchanged in the economy. Enforcement renders the specification of 
property rights credible and effective. 
Absent some sort of enforcement mechanism, the constraints on a firm’s behavior are non-
binding and thus are subject to "cheap talk" analysis (Farrell, 1996). The ultimate goal of 
enforcement is to induce socially optimal behavior, which may deviate from individually-
optimal behavior because of externalities, mistakes, or other sources of market failures. 
Socially optimal behavior includes investments in protection (harm avoidance) technology 
and in operating behavior that results in socially desirable outcomes (which generally means 
behavior that is in conformance with the rules6). The enforcement mechanism may mandate 
(or proscribe) certain behaviors (e.g., safety regulations that specify construction materials, 
standards, or functionality) or impose rewards/sanctions that may induce incentives toward 
desirable behaviors or penalize undesirable behaviors or outcomes (harms).  
Shavell (1993) focuses on three important aspects of any enforcement regime: (1) the 
timing of enforcement action (whether ex ante – before a potentially "harmful" action has 
occurred; or ex post – after a potentially harmful action has occurred, but potentially before 
or after an actual harm has been realized); (2) the form of enforcement sanctions (whether 
monetary or otherwise, where latter may include criminal incarceration); and (3) whether 
private or public enforcement (i.e., what role do private individuals play in detecting bad 
behaviors or harms, or in implementing sanctions and responses). Compliance with 
enforcement mechanisms may be voluntary (e.g. self-regulation, self-enforcement) or 
compulsory (e.g., enforced by the third parties). The third parties might be other market 
players (e.g., other firms, consumers , or market research firms) or they could be regulatory 
authorities (i.e., the "police"). Regulatory authorities could be an agency (e.g., FCC, NTIA), an 
administrative court, or a general court. Further, agency power may be delegated to an 
industry enforcement bureau or agency (like towing services in Washington, DC, and private 
security forces). The industry delegate might be an approved industry self-regulation 
authority, including a formal arbitration society like the AAA.7 Hybrid approaches exist as well. 
For example, Braithwaite (1982) proposed “enforced self-regulation,” where the goal is to 
force companies to internalize enforcement costs since government-based external 
enforcement is expensive and ineffective due to asymmetric information problems and 
bureaucracy costs. He argues that industry self-regulation can be enforced by government 
monitoring of the compliance activity by determining if it is independent, appropriately 
structured (i.e., has the requisite resources to complete its task, appropriate incentives), etc.  
Funding of the enforcement infrastructure is yet another important question. Several 
methods for funding have been applied in different industries. For example, in many 
contexts, the enforcement action is funded from general government tax receipts (e.g., 
Homeland Security), while in others, industry-specific taxes or fees (e.g., license fees for 
                                                 
6 We say "generally" because following the rules is not always socially optimal (e.g., the driver who 
exceeds the speed limit in a medical emergency) nor is rule-deviating behavior necessarily 
intentional (e.g., mistakes may be common). 
7 See http://www.adr.org/. 
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hunting and fishing) may be used to fund the enforcement effort. Additionally, funds 
collected in the form of sanctions may be used to help defray enforcement costs. For 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses the fines it collects from violators 
of environmental regulations to partially fund its activities. The choice of funding source and 
its level have a direct impact on the effectiveness of the enforcement regime (e.g., more 
police results in lower crime rates, but costs more as well) and the incentives of participants 
to comply (e.g., excessive certification or licensing fees may deter potential participants).  
An optimal enforcement mechanism is inextricably linked to the property rights regime and 
economic environment in which it is expected to function. The costs of inducing good 
behavior (avoiding bad behavior) must be balanced against the social costs and benefits 
under different scenarios. A critical component of those costs are the costs of the 
enforcement mechanism itself. For example, an important enforcement cost is associated 
with the collection of evidence and establishing its provenance at various stages in the 
process. The process needs to anticipate the challenges of detecting "bad" behaviors (i.e., 
behaviors that have a high probability of resulting in actual harms) or actual harms8 ; 
establishing liability9; adjudicating whatever sanctions are appropriate10; and then imposing 
those sanctions11. Evidence collection can be done by the market participants or by a third 
party (such as government). The costs of such information processing/decision-making may 
be significant and these costs need to be weighed with due consideration of the 
costs/benefits associated with the rights that the enforcement mechanism is intended to 
enable. Thus, when it is difficult (expensive) to detect harmful behavior or undertake the 
other steps required by the enforcement mechanism, it may be preferable to rely on 
                                                 
8 The connection between behaviors deemed harmful and the actual incidence of harms is often 
tentative. For example, shooting a gun in public may not hit anyone; yet, we sanction such behavior 
and apply escalating penalties based on the nature of the crime and extent of harm that results: 
illegal discharge of a weapon may earn a citation, killing someone by accident a manslaughter 
charge, and premeditated murder a much more severe penalty.  
9 The party who engages in the bad behavior may not be the party who is deemed responsible. The 
company who manufacturers an unsafe product may be liable for the harm caused by a consumer 
using the product. The assignment of liability impacts incentives – in the product liability case, it may 
strengthen the incentive of manufacturers to design safe products, while at the same time, lessening 
the incentive of consumers to use products safely (e.g., read product safety manuals) if the 
consumers believe they will be absolved from any resulting harm. Apportioning liability is part of the 
enforcement mechanism and a key feature of the property rights regime.  
10 The regulatory process may involve multiple rounds of appeals and costly bureaucratic process to 
help mitigate the risk of imposing sanctions unfairly or inappropriately (e.g., Type I or II errors in the 
enforcement process which may fail to detect bad behavior or may label good behavior bad).  
11 Getting delinquent parents to pay child support payments or collecting parking ticket proceeds 
involves significant resources in ex post enforcement.  
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stronger ex ante rules (if the prospective harms are large) or simply tolerate the adverse 
effects of the bad behaviors (if the benefits of allowing more operating freedom exceed the 
prospects for significant social harms).  
Furthermore, for ex post enforcement to have appropriate ex ante deterrence effects, the 
enforcement remedies must be credible. Rational actors will consider the costs of 
enforcement in their assessment of how likely it is that the promised remedies will actually 
be assigned. The need to provide for appeal procedures and other process protections to 
protect against abuse of the enforcement mechanism to abuse innocent parties adds to the 
costs of enforcement. If an agent believes the principal's enforcement costs are excessive, it 
will not believe the enforcement threat is credible.The participation of both the agents 
whose behavior the enforcement mechanism seeks to influence and the agents responsible 
for operating the enforcement mechanism (e.g., the police) needs to be incentive 
compatible.  
The choice of how to design the enforcement mechanism directly and indirectly impacts the 
effectiveness of the mechanism and its costs. Moreover, these are likely to evolve over time 
with the market, technology, and policy.12  
For example, the EPA used to regulate water and air quality with only a few metrics (like 
dissolved particles per volume); but then improvements in detection and monitoring 
technologies coupled with greater understanding of the relative risks from the presence of 
specific toxins induced a move to more complex rules that specified concentrations for 
specific compounds (e.g, cyanide PPM, etc.). Adoption of such rules, enabled by better 
monitoring technologies, induced changes throughout the environmental regulation 
ecosystem (better control technology, lawyers with more expertise about specific harms and 
technology-specific regulations and evidence rules, new monitoring infrastructures) that 
induced further dynamic responses. The sources of information (whether collected from the 
basic operating infrastructure as a byproduct of normal operations, contributed by market 
participants as part of mandatory or voluntary testing, or collected by third-party watch dogs) 
impacts how it may be used in the regulatory (enforcement) process (e.g, to target 
enforcement investigations, to prove liability, to monitor compliance with rules, etc.).  
 
                                                 
12 Enforcement costs may fall as users and enforcers become more familiar with the mechanism. 
However, this is not always the case since dedicated criminatls may become more sophisticated in 
avoiding detection or the police in catching criminals – implying an arm's race. The incentives of 
participants to pursue such an arm's race is also something that may be considered as part of the 
design of the enforcement mechanism.  
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2.1 EX ANTE VS. EX POST ENFORCEMENT 
According to Stewart (1981), ex ante licensing, clearance, or certification processes provide 
a prophylactic strategy of ensuring that unsafe technologies or processes that result in 
undesirable social performance are never applied. These may include a mix of 
mandates/proscriptions against certain behaviors or incentives (rewards/sanctions) to 
induce actors to adopt good (avoid bad) behaviors. Examples include limits on radio 
functionality (e.g., making non-software radios harder to modify ex post to operate illegally), 
unleaded fuel standards, or power limits and spectrum masks on transmitters. Good 
process rules and audits make it more likely that bad behavior will be detected before 
significant harm occurs, and when harms occur, may facilitate remediation (minimizing or 
compensating harms).  
As noted earlier, when it is costly to detect harmful behaviors and enforce sanctions, then it 
may be preferrable to simply proscribe the behavior. For example, those who accept 
Faulhaber's assessment (cited earlier) of the potential risks from CRs and the lack of 
effective enforcement remedies might opt for simply precluding the certification of CRs and 
sanctions against vendors who sell or contribute to the sale of such devices, in the same 
way as gun control advocates argue against the sale of automatic weapons or armor-
piercing bullets. The cost of strong ex ante rules is that they need to be enforceable and 
pose the risk of overly restricting behaviors that may be welfare enhancing (e.g., innovation). 
For example, a lack of clarity on what constitutes contributing to the sale of proscribed 
automatic weapons (e.g., who is an authorized seller/buyer?) may make the ex ante 
proscription ineffective; or, too much clarity might raise the costs of selling even legal guns 
to such an extent as to suppress socially-beneficial economic activity.  
Often when the range of behaviors becomes more complex and the interaction between 
specific actions and potential harms harder to track, it is advisable to allow the actors who 
best understand those implications greater discretion. This is a key motivation for shifting 
from rate of return regulation to price cap regulation for public utilities. A shift from specific 
rules to incentive-based rules is one way in which such discretion may be enabled. 13 
However, a shift to incentives, with reliance on sanctions/rewards that may be imposed ex 
post, confronts its own information/implementation challenges.14  
                                                 
13  Regulatory forbearance offers an option for permitting greater latitude for discretion without 
having to formally change the rules.  
14 For example, increased discretion provides greater latitude for firms to evade regulatory controls. 
Analogously, permitting regulatory agencies significant latitude to engage in forebearance risks 
legislators losing control of the agency, which may act in ways contrary to the public interest (e.g., in 
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For example, ex post enforcement via penalties/rewards is uncertain because firms' 
responses to such incentives are often difficult to predict. The ex post enforcement 
remedies may include the revocation of licenses, fines, product recalls, or modifications to 
operating rights. The point of penalties is they impose a cost on the guilty party that induces 
ex ante behavior ("I do not park illegally because of the threat of parking tickets"). To provide 
an effective deterrent, the expected incidence of the penalty being imposed, taking into 
account the implications of imperfect enforcement (not all crimes are punished), has to be 
sufficiently large to offset the private benefits from undertaking the bad behavior. However, 
if penalties are too large, the risk of imperfect detection penalizing innocents may deter 
economically beneficial behavior (e.g,. investment). In the event of harm having occurred, 
the enforcement mechanism also has to minimize the social costs of the harm and allocate 
the cost burden. If the enforcement mechanism is able to sufficiently compensate the 
injured parties (e.g., those causing the harm pay those who suffered either in money or 
spectrum access preferences), thereby reducing the expected harm from the bad behavior, 
then the deterrence value of enforcement is less. When the harm is excessive congestion 
("pollution") with negative effects that are diffuse (i.e., cause a small harm to a large number 
of users, resulting in a large aggregate harm), while the benefits of the bad behavior (i.e., 
excessive consumption of resources) are realized by the individual undertaking the behavior 
then the transaction costs associated with compensating all of those harmed (and thus 
rendering the harm "reversible") is likely to be large and ex ante deterrence becomes more 
important. There may also be rewards (the mirror images of these sanctions) for good 
behaviors. Because some of the costs of ex post enforcement are contingent, computing the 
prospective costs of enforcement is inherently uncertain.15  
The ex ante and ex post enforcement effects are inextricably linked. For example, if the ex 
ante rules and processes are sufficiently strong then ex post harms may be prevented 
before they occur. Also, certain types of ex ante rules may be easier to monitor and hence 
lower the cost of enforcement. Even strong ex ante rules may require ex post enforcement; 
for example, licensing approval for equipment is usually based on a prototype or pre-
production unit, but compliance of production units may require some kind of policing to 
ensure compliance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
failing to prosecute violators of environmental regulations that the public and its legislators have 
deemed worthy of enforcement).  
15 For example, large sanctions may successfully deter bad behavior, and consequently, never be 
imposed. As the probability of imposing a sanction decreases, its ability to induce good behavior may 
also decline. For example, catastrophic failures are difficult to provision for since they are, by design, 
rare events, and their rarity may depend on behaviors that are hard to enforce (e.g., maintaining 
adequate redundant capacity).  
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2.2 CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED ENFORCEMENT 
In general, the enforcement can be centralized or decentralized, or more generally, a mix of 
both. The classic form of centralized enforcement relies on a regulator such as the FCC or 
NTIA, but could be undertaken by a spectrum sharing broker or band manager (i.e., a New 
York Stock Exchange for spectrum management). Decentralized enforcement mechanisms 
might include other radios in the environment that might, for example, refuse to forward 
packets or connect to radios that are behaving badly (e.g, as implemented in a mesh 
protocol); or might rely on rights holders pursuing tort or trespass claims against alleged 
infringers.  
Both centralized and decentralized enforcement mechanisms may include technical, market, 
and institutional components. For example, a beaconing signal with information about the 
availability of spectrum holes or other operating instructions or a database system (for 
managing access to TV white spaces) may be employed as centralized technical 
enforcement components; while radio "black boxes" or collaborative sensing (Weiss et al, 
2010) might be employed as elements in decentralized enforcement mechanisms. The 
centralized or decentralized enforcement might rely on reputation effects (are the radios 
likely to interact over time, and if so, are they identifiable for purposes of assigning 
reputations to specific radios or operators?).  
The data collected or behaviors managed by such technical elements would contribute to 
the evidentiary basis for any enforcement adjudication process (e.g., statistically significant 
measurement of proscribed transmission behavior may be used to assign liability in a civil 
torts claim). The viability of this depends on the radio modes of operation and the property 
rights regime in force. For example, is the alleged offender a "hit-and-run" situation like that 
anticipated by Faulhaber's mobile CR or a fixed location radio that may be dynamically 
selecting operating frequencies? Or, is the standard for bringing a harm claim based on the 
ability of the plaintiff to demonstrate an economic harm or merely detect the existence of 
transmission energy in the rights space of the plaintiff? In the former case, the need to 
prove an economic harm would likely imply a higher enforcement cost than the need to 
simply prove the existence of transmissions, although focusing on economic harm is closer 
to the efficiency goal for spectrum management.16  
                                                 
16 As noted earlier, full consideration of what an appropriate definition of harmful interference should 
be is beyond the scope of this paper. For some further discussion of possible approaches to this, see 
for example, de Vries (2010) or de Vries & Sieh (2012). 
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Radio "black boxes" are an especially interesting enforcement mechanism.17 Like the "black 
boxes" on airplanes that are used for forensic crash analysis, it would be feasible to include 
similar elements in radio devices to assist in forensic analysis of radio behaviors. This would 
provide a credible and potentially light-weight mechanism for auditing radio behaviors. A mix 
of black boxes and the ability to audit database registration information can be combined to 
flexibly mix centralized and decentralized control mechanisms. Radios might be required to 
register their location and operating requirements with a database (or databases), and 
operating rights might be granted with time-limited-leases that have to be renewed (Chapin 
& Lehr, 2007b). The PCAST (2012) report advocates using such mechanisms, especially 
database registration with time-limited authorizations, as important enforcement 
mechanisms for sharing in government spectrum bands, but as PCAST (2012) notes, 
experience learned there will benefit all spectrum users in all bands.  
The ability to credibly track radio behavior is obviously valuable for provisioning (forecasting 
capacity needs) as well as real-time operation (identifying spectrum white space), and the 
benefits of those activities might be sufficient to warrant adoption of a database approach in 
its own right. However, the ability to support forensic accounting contributes to the 
enforcement function. It helps reduce enforcement transaction costs, and thereby, improves 
the credibility of enforcement. Potential offenders may face a higher expectation that they 
will be detected and prosecuted, and innocents may have less fear of unfair prosecution. As 
PCAST (2012) and users of airplane "black boxes" recognize, unrestricted access to the 
audit trail of behavior poses a threat to privacy and confidentiality.18 To address these 
challenges as well as to secure the databases and other spectrum management 
infrastructure sufficiently to ensure its reliability (e.g, protect it against attacks), access to 
the management infrastructure, including the databases, needs to be authorized.  
Another focus for decentralized enforcement involves advances in spectrum sharing policy 
language research. A “policy language” is a selection of facts specifying spectrum sharing 
rules and procedures. A "policy reasoner" within the CR uses the information about allowed 
policies and various environment data (e.g., location, real-time RF sensing data, etc.) to 
make predictable decisions about its operating behavior, allowing the CR to adapt in real-
time. The formalization of these design elements involves a significant amount of industry 
                                                 
17 The authors would like to especially acknowledge John Chapin for first calling to our attention this 
idea and for helpful discussions on this and other elements of the enforcement challenge.  
18 The privacy concerns are a special concern in government spectrum sharing because of the many 
uses of the RF for national defense and security applications.  
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standardization.19  The IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 41 (SCC41) is currently 
engaged in standards projects in the areas of DSA, CRs, interference management, 
coordination of wireless systems, advanced spectrum management, and policy languages 
for next generation radio systems. The 1900.x working groups are part of SCC41 (IEEE, 
2008). For example, IEEE 1900.5 Working Group is focusing on policy language and policy 
architectures for managing CR for DSA applications.  
While policy language-based CR approaches hold great promise, they need to be nested 
within an enforcement ecosystem that ensures compliance with the rules and supplements 
the detection and enforcement adjudication process with complementary mechanisms. For 
example, policy-smart CRs are often unhelpful in dealing with rogue transmitters. 
The level of involvement of either centralized or decentralized enforcement will vary based 
on the type of sharing environment (e.g. static, periodic or stochastic), transparency and 
clarity of spectrum rights, and the range of technical mechanisms that are available. 
Generally, the best solution will include a mix of centralized and decentralized technical and 
non-technical mechanisms for enforcing compliance with the sharing regime.  
3 ENFORCEMENT IN DSA SYSTEMS 
A principal goal of spectrum management is to prevent harmful interference. From an 
economics perspective, interference is harmful when it impedes the ability of the party 
holding usage rights to fully exploit the RF electrospace in question (Vany et al., 1969; 
Matheson, 2006). In practical terms, interference results in system capacity reductions, 
which can result in system malfunctions which may translate into lost profits. In some 
systems, such as public safety communications systems, interference can have life-and-
death consequences. 
Interference is experienced at the receiver when the receiver seeks to decode signals 
intended for it. Signals from other transmitters may appear as noise, limiting the ability of 
the receiver to perform its function. A perfect receiver could use any of the dimensions of 
electrospace (location, frequency, angle, time, code, etc.) to disentangle the signals, but real 
world limitations require transmissions to be separated in electrospace. Better technologies 
for transmitters and receivers, and for the radio and other networks in which they are 
embedded, can support higher utilization of the electrospace as a whole.  
Traditionally, interference is classified as in-band interference and out-of-band interference. 
In-band interference is mainly due to other systems’ electronic emissions, and out-of-band 
                                                 
19  Industry standards are a mechanism for coordinating the decentralized behavior of multiple 
market actors.  
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interference is partially due to receiver sensitivity. From an enforcement perspective, what 
determines whether there is or is not harmful interference is a function of what the property 
rights regime is. For example, under some interpretations of exclusively-licensed spectrum, 
the licensee (primary user) has a right to exclude other users/uses from the spectrum. This 
interpretation is analogous to the law of trespass in real property, which protects the 
property-owner from unauthorized use of the property by others. Even in real estate, the 
existence of easements, zoning restrictions, and a diversity of remedies to enforce real 
estate property rights20 attest to the limitations on the exclusion right; similarly, provisions 
for secondary use by Ultrawideband (UWB), Part 15, or TVWS devices in different bands 
might overlay and potentially conflict with incumbent primary licensed claims.  
In contrast, the traditional view of unlicensed use, as it occurs under Part 15 rules and in the 
ISM bands used by cordless telephones, microwave ovens, and WiFi devices, requires the 
devices to conform with power and other operating protocol restrictions, and to tolerate 
interference from other devices. The Part 15 devices have no property right to exclude other 
conforming devices, but they do have an implicit right to interference protection. The design 
of the rules is such that operators may form reasonable expectations of interference. 
Traditionally interference is managed ex ante in wireless systems through a combination of 
transmitter specifications, receiver specifications and white spaces. Transmitter 
specifications include “emission masks” which indicate how signal energy may be 
transmitted in frequency and antenna parameters, including type and height. Together, 
these transmitter specifications can be used to predict, with high likelihood, the 
electrospace the signal/service will occupy. Receiver specifications include factors such as 
bandwidth and sensitivity that, together with transmitter specifications, are useful in 
predicting the performance of a wireless communications system. White spaces are a 
generic term for gaps in time, space and frequency between adjacent blocks of electrospace 
to prevent interference.  
Traditional approaches to enforcement largely assume fixed transmitters. Because they are 
fixed, the cost of ex post enforcement is relatively low and the ex ante measures are 
relatively easy to write. When systems become mobile, the locus of the transmitter is 
uncertain, making ex ante measures based on transmitter specifications less successful in 
avoiding interference (willful or not).  
                                                 
20 For example, a tort claim for damages associated with trespass may be limited to the economic 
harm realized. The injured party may also seek injunctive relief against the trespasser which might 
induce police enforcement of the rights. Grants of public rights of way and other zoning restrictions 
may constrain trespass claims.  
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Traditionally, the ex ante parameters are designed into the hardware of the transmitters and 
receivers. These then undergo acceptance testing to ensure compliance with the regulations 
before they are used. After being in operation, the components used in transmitters and 
receivers may change due to age, heat and other environmental factors, which cause the 
transmitters and receivers to perform in unexpected (illegal) ways, which may cause 
interference with adjacent electrospace. Engineers may also deliberately alter these 
components to commercially benefit the owner of the transmitter, which may also cause 
interference. These potential outcomes (and others as well, such as rogue transmitters) 
raise the need for ex post enforcement. 
When interference occurs, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau is expected to investigate and 
adjudicate. This often involves bringing the offending transmitter back into compliance, but 
can require spectrum monitoring to gather data to support an action. In practice, as Sandvig 
(2011) indicates in his case studies, interference mitigation may be more informal and may 
involve direct or mediated interaction between the interfered party and the offender. 
From the perspective of enforcement, there are two general types of enforcement actions 
that are needed: enforcement associated with “everyday” use and enforcement associated 
with rogue radios (either deliberate bad actors or malfunctioning radios). Enforcement of the 
first kind is more often associated with events such as spurious interference due to rare RF 
propagation irregularies, equipment de-tuning or production faults, and other largely 
unintentional interference. This includes reconciling interference disputes when property 
rights are unclear (e.g., a "legal" transmitter causes interference for a "legal" receiver). In 
contrast, enforcement of the second kind is associated with attacks, deliberate acts, or 
severly malfunctioning radios. We focus on the former kind, which is associated with 
“normal” system operations rather than unpredicable “rogue” events where the goals and 
modality are unpredictable.  
To highlight this, we consider the analogy of traffic laws and enforcement. In managing 
traffic, society has constructed a collection of ex ante rules (e.g., traffic flows on the right or 
left but not both, speed limits, etc.). Some of these rules require less enforcement (e.g. locus 
of traffic flow) and others require more (e.g., speed limits) in order to prevent these rules 
from being merely benign advice (i.e., cheap talk). In the case of the latter, society uses a 
mix of fixed speed cameras and mobile police; of these, speed cameras are more suitable 
for routine enforcement whereas the latter are better suited for special circumstances (e.g., 
traffic congestion, construction, weather emergencies, etc.). This also highlights a tradeoff 
between enforcement precision and cost, with speed cameras being non-adaptive to 
circumstances but relatively cheap and police officers being highly adaptive (and precise) 
but expensive.  
Moreover, these different enforcement "technologies" complement and alter the optimal 
mode of operation of each. Police are ex ante and ex post – they act to detect bad acts 
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(before harm happens – by giving citations for cars with illegal brake lights or for driving too 
fast, even if not unsafely – and they have discretion); their presence provides assurance of 
enforcement so deters bad behavior just by being there; and they enforce ex post when 
harm has happened – by assessing liability in accidents, penalizing unsafe driving with 
stronger tickets, and by testifying in court. The police behave differently in a world with 
cameras; that is, they know where traffic is most likely to require their oversight, know what 
evidence they need to establish at the scene vs. what is recorded remotely. Traffic laws can 
also change with technology. For example one can image a "speed pass" that allows 
different vehicles to travel at different speeds based on some criteria (e.g., ex ante driver 
skill certification), variable charging for use of HOV lanes during congestion periods, or 
modifications to car operation in response to car/road real-time diagnostics (e.g., detection 
of low tire pressure and bad road conditions). 
3.1 IMPLICATIONS OF CR, SDR, AND DSA FOR ENFORCEMENT 
The enforcement challenges and practices noted above are not new and existed before the 
invention of SDRs, CRs, and the other technologies that enable DSA. The need to secure 
critical infrastructures like electronic communications capabilities against attacks by 
hostiles and to ensure appropriate quality of service has always been important. However 
the move to DSA has important implications for the entire wireless ecosystem, and in 
particular for the enforcement challenge. 
On the one hand, the transition to DSA exacerbates the interference enforcement challenge. 
First, by enabling more intensive use of the electrospace, DSA increases the likelihood of 
interference harms occurring. With more radios, users, and uses sharing the electrospace, 
there are many more opportunities for the signals to interfere. Traditional approaches to 
limiting this are threatened by the desire to treat white spaces (in geography, time, 
frequency, or code space) that had previously been part of guard bands as opportunities for 
additional spectrum use.  
Second, DSA enhances the dynamic flexibility of radios, allowing them to be more mobile. 
SDR and CR technologies raise the potential of "hit-and-run" operation – but whether this is 
a significant threat (as posited by Faulhaber, 2006) or just something we have to deal with 
is an interesting question. Mobility certainly raises issues for detection and reputation-based 
enforcement incentives.  
On the other hand, DSA can alleviate many enforcement concerns. By enabling increased 
utilization of scarce RF, DSA helps reduce the costs of scarcity. This includes facilitating the 
growth in wireless and the attendant opportunities for smart infrastructure, green 
technologies, smart healthcare, and all of the other market opportunities that might 
otherwise be precluded from emerging without expanded access to spectrum resources. The 
desire to enable such growth and the potential benefits it promises for overall economic 
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productivity and innovation are key motivators behind the National Broadband Plan (FCC, 
2010) and the White House's call for an additional 500MHz of spectrum for mobile 
broadband (White House, 2010). The potential harms from increased interference for legacy 
uses and old radio technologies needs to be balanced against the potential gains from 
allowing the new uses. As the potential for unrealized benefits rises, the balance tilts away 
from excessive caution in protecting against interference harms. 
Moreover, DSA and other new radio technologies contribute to making radio systems more 
robust to interference. Radios capable of multiple operating modes can switch radio modes 
to avoid interference, just as today's mobile broadband services offload data traffic from 
cellular networks (where capacity is scarce) to WiFi (where capacity is relatively plentiful) 
when feasible. With DSA the technical options for switching are greatly expanded. Abuse of 
this flexibility could result in "hit and run" operations that would be hard to control and might 
allow bad actors to more easily circumvent radio rules. For example, SDRs were originally 
perceived to raise enforcement risks because they could be altered post certification by 
updating the software, and because of the increased range of operating modes, and 
therefore posed a more complex/difficult challenge for certification (of safe use). However, 
hardware radios can also be altered post-manufacture (even if that is potentially a bit more 
difficult) and suitable technical controls on how software radio updates are managed can 
help address the challenges of post-certification modifications.  
While DSA embeds functionality that poses additional enforcement challenges, it also offers 
new tools for technical enforcement. Distributed intelligence to the radios means that the 
radios are increasingly capable of participating in intelligent and dynamic automated 
enforcement mechanisms. Through protocols, policy-based language frameworks, and other 
tools, the radio systems ability to technically manage its compliance with sharing protocols 
has been enhanced. Responses like database registrations (PCAST, 2012), time-limited-
leases (Chapin & Lehr, 2007b), and protocol-based identification schemes (Atia, Sahai, & 
Saligrama, 2008) offer mechanisms for addressing these challenges. Most of the technical 
literature cited earlier on CR/SDR and DSA enforcement addresses such technical remedies. 
However, the enforcement challenge does not depend solely on the technical remedies. 
Institutional remedies that include the risk of legal prosecution complement and interact 
with the technical remedies (like the highway cameras noted earlier). Informed automobile 
drivers know that their mileage would be enhanced if they disabled pollution control devices 
like catalytic converters, and some drivers do precisely that, however most drivers obey the 
laws. Whether drivers obey the regulations designed to limit car pollution because of their 
concern for the environment, fear of legal prosecution, or lack of expertise in effecting the 
necessary device modifications matters less than the fact that all of these motivations are 
part of the overall enforcement ecosystem.  
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With respect to the other general features of enforcement mechanisms, it is at present 
unclear how the transition to DSA might tip the system. For example, in the choice between 
ex ante versus ex post enforcement or centralized versus decentralized enforcement, 
arguments may be made in both directions. On the one hand, DSA radios are more complex 
and capable of more local decision-making, which generically inclines one toward allowing 
increased discretion and potentially toward increased reliance on ex post enforcement. It 
also allows more intelligence and hence control of functionality to be distributed, which 
would seem to favor decentralized enforcement. On the other hand, the mobility of DSA 
radios poses significant challenges for detection of potential harms that may render ex post 
enforcement overly expensive and hence ineffective. Or, the ability to communicate with a 
central operator may render DSA radios more amenable to centralized control (e.g., if control 
is via a beaconing system). But this is a naïve interpretation. Surely the right response is for 
modifications to both ex post and ex ante enforcement. Progress in the design of secure 
software systems and policy-language CRs can help make certification easier (facilitating 
control of proscribed behaviors); progress with technologies like collaborative sensing and 
radio identification schemas may help reduce the detection burden (facilitating operational 
control and forensic analysis); and new institutional frameworks or property rights regimes 
can help provide structured (band-specific) enforcement regimes.  
In the next sub-section, we consider the diversity of property regimes that already exist and 
may be expected to continue to exist to enable the many types of spectrum sharing and DSA 
that are likely to be needed. 
3.2 DSA, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND ENFORCEMENT 
Early in the discussion of spectrum management reform, a number of analysts focused on 
the binary choice between licensed and unlicensed spectrum – identifying the former with 
"property rights" (which was short for "private property rights," most often analogized to real 
estate) and the latter with "commons" (where no one had a private property right).21 While 
this syllogism proved useful in clarifying thinking, it is overly simplistic and has lead to 
confusion or silly "yes/no" debates about whether all spectrum should be exclusive licensed 
or unlicensed. Today, policymakers generally recognize the need for multiple regimes, and 
the potential for hierarchies of rights. As discussed earlier, exclusively licensed spectrum 
encompasses a diversity of regimes: PCS licensees have different rights and obligations 
than do 700MHz licensees or TV broadcast stations. Additionally, users in a commons 
regime are subject to protocol restrictions and norms that govern use. In the end, we need 
to recognize that all property rights regimes imply a mix of rights and obligations for users. 
Following Demsetz (1967): 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Faulhaber & Farber (2002) or Hazlett (2001).  
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"In the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role. Property rights are an 
instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man 
form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others. 
These expectations find expression in the laws, customs, and mores of a society. An 
owner of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him to act in 
particular ways. An owner expects the community to prevent others from interfering 
with his actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifications 
of his rights." 
This quote applies equally well to private and commons property, and any other property 
rights regime one might anticipate – and moreover, that sort of generality is helpful. 
Peha (2009), Buddhikot (2007), Weiss and Lehr (2009) among others have shown that 
“DSA” is not a single technology but a cluster of technologies. Spectrum sharing regimes are 
allocations of usage rights over the electrospace. Because the usage of an electrospace 
may result in incidental or deliberate interference, enforcement seeks to ensure compliance 
with the usage rights regime. It stands to reason, then, that different sharing modes (i.e., 
rights regimes) suggest different enforcement mechanisms. Weiss and Lehr (2009) 
proposed a taxonomy of the principle sharing modes for DSA; see Table 1. 
Table 1 - Taxonomy of generic DSA approches 
 Non-Cooperative Cooperative 
Primary  Unlicensed, WiFi  Secondary markets (spectrum license 
trading)  
Secondary  Easements, Opportunistic use, TV 
White Spaces, UWB 
MVNO, secondary use (negotiated)  
 
The distinction between non-cooperative and cooperative sharing focuses on the presence 
(or absence) of explicit coordination over usage; while the distinction between primary and 
secondary delineates a partial hierarchy in interference protection rights. Primary users have 
a prior claim to interference protection from secondary users, who generally are presumed 
to be allowed to operate only as long as they do not cause harmful interference to the 
primary user, where what constitutes harmful interference may be determined exogenously 
by the sharing regime (non-cooperatively) or endogenously by the parties sharing the 
spectrum (cooperative). The entries in the table provide illustrative examples (but are hardly 
exhaustive) of different DSA-enabled sharing instances.  
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In non-cooperative, primary sharing, each spectrum user has similar usage rights. Most 
unlicensed approaches fall into this category. While these systems may use a form of 
spectrum etiquette (Satapathy & Peha, 1997; Raychaudhuri & Xianpeng, 2003) this is less 
an explicit coordination than it is an algorithm for synchronizing usage as peers among 
similar kinds of users. The use of a shared etiquette is not a requirement for using 
unlicensed bands but may be an interoperability requirement for some kinds of systems 
(e.g., IEEE 802.11-based WLANs) 
Non-cooperative secondary sharing involves a hierarchy of rights, with the license holder 
having dominant rights and the sharer having subordinate rights. The subordinate rights are 
typically granted by the regulatory agency (as is the case in the FCC’s TV White Spaces 
policies) and require that the sharer operate without causing interference to the 
licenseholder. There is no explicit coordination between the license holder and the sharer, 
hence the “non-cooperative” designation.  
In contrast, cooperative secondary sharing involves explicit agreements between the license 
holder and the sharer (also called the primary and secondary users). A classic example of 
cooperative secondary sharing is the Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) agreement, in 
which a primary and secondary user negotiate a spectrum sharing arrangement that is 
contractually specified. In these agreements, the secondary user typically uses virtual 
capacity rather than physically sharing regions of electrospace; thus, the secondary user 
takes advantage of the primary user’s infrastructure. But it is equally possible for parties to 
enter into an agreement in which electrospace is shared through explicit coordination, as 
was studied by Tonmukayakul and Weiss (2008).  
Clearly, each of these sharing modes imply different rights schema. Since we are focusing 
on sharing in DSA, the distinction between ownership and usage rights of the spectrum must 
be observed. Further, the set of enforcement strategies must be clear about which right 
should be enforced and how. For the purposes of this research, we will focus on the 
enforcement of usage rights, not ownership rights.22  
Just as clearly, each of these sharing modes implies a different enforcement regime. The 
requirements of cooperative regimes depend heavily on the specific concerns and priorities 
                                                 
22 A key motivation for adopting property rights systems discussed by Demsetz (1964) is to enable 
markets to better take account of what are sometimes referred to as "externalities" but he prefers to 
refer to as "side effects." The property rights allow potential users to understand what it is they own 
and that facilitates the transfer of those property rights, and in so doing, to allow appropriate 
interpretation by market participants of the price signals from transactions for those rights. The 
usage of property rights and their ownership/transfer are obviously related, but there are a whole set 
of other rules/regulations that may govern how the property rights may be transferred and what that 
may imply for enforcement that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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of the sharing parties; for example, a spectrum owner who has a highly sensitive application 
may be particularly keen on ensuring that very little energy “spillover” occurs outside the 
shared electrospace, and would find it worthwhile to invest in enforcement mechanisms that 
ensure this. Other agreements might be focused more on measuring usage and associating 
remuneration accordingly. At a high-level, enforcement in cooperative sharing regimes looks 
like a contracting regime where the parties may negotiate arbitrarily complex terms to 
constrain their behavior. At one extreme, we might view cooperative sharing as equivalent to 
exclusive control of the spectrum assets. For example, one might view a mobile operators 
management of spectrum sharing across multiple (potentially discontiguous) spectrum 
bands via LTE as an extreme form of cooperative spectrum sharing. Negotiated sharing 
between LTE operators for co-primary or primary/secondary access all have great potential 
to realize the benefits of DSA and the increased resource use it promises.  
The cooperative sharing/contracting perspective allows the parties to custom-design their 
enforcement mechanisms to a great extent, and in so doing, leverage the substantial 
institutional structure for legal enforcement of contracts and spectrum licenses. Private 
negotiated contracts might provide for third-party monitoring, escrow accounts, binding 
arbitration for dispute resolution, private police, as well as a host of technical remedies that 
might be more difficult to impose on non-cooperative sharing environments. For example, 
cooperating parties might be willing to share detailed operating plans and data to allow 
higher utilization sharing, or comply with specific resource allocation protocols that tightly 
regulate each party's access. Ideally, such cooperative sharing might aspire to the ideal of 
the Coasian bargaining solution.  
While these are very interesting it is difficult to speculate about what might be optimal from 
an enforcement perspective without considering the specific case. Thus, in the balance of 
this paper, we shall pay more attention to the enforcement challenge in non-cooperative 
situations. However, we emphasize once again that the broader consideration of the 
enforcement challenge is necessary since what we adopt in the way of infrastructure for 
enforcement and learn in non-cooperative or cooperative situations will be mutually 
beneficial. We expect the two types of regimes to complement and interact with each other 
over times. In some cases, we might expect applications to emerge first in non-cooperative 
regimes and then seek to move to cooperative regimes once sufficient experience and 
activity demonstrates that the further customization of the enforcement regime offered by 
cooperative sharing is warranted. Alternatively, we might expect certain DSA capabilities to 
be developed first in cooperative regimes where the added flexibility to provide for 
enforcement and internalize potential harms (externalities) provides additional comfort 
against bad outcomes.  
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3.3 ENFORCEMENT IN DIFFERENT DSA ENVIRONMENTS 
As should be clear from the above, the key element of any framework for managing harmful 
interference23 is the mechanism for enforcement of usage rights, regardless of how those 
rights were obtained. The rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference 
vary by band (licensed/unlicensed), type of users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay) and 
type of use (fixed/mobile).  
The general enforcement framework described above suggests a combination of ex ante 
and ex post measures that balance the cost of enforcement with the needed precision. Ex 
ante mechanisms deter undesirable behavior while ex post mechanisms remediate the 
consequences of that behavior. 
Table 2- Varieties of DSA enforcement environments 
 Non-Subordinate Rights Subordinate Rights 























In the table, the term “fixed” refers to the transmitter location. In general, enforcement of 
fixed usage rights is easier (cheaper) because the position of the transmitter is known. 
When transmitters might be mobile, usage rights might be based on the “worst case” 
transmitter location; such an approach to defining the rights minimizes interference at the 
cost of spectrum efficiency. The notion of subordination of rights reflects whether the use is 
as a “primary” (non-subordinate) or “secondary” (subordinate). PCAST (2012) suggests even 
richer hierarchies of rights – where in addition to secondary rights holders, there might be 
tertiary rights holds holders who could operate only if such operation would not interfere 
with either primary or secondary users. In that construction, the secondary users of 
                                                 
23 Note that interference need not be harmful; for example, Weiss and Cui (2012) proposed a 
framework for trading interference rights and Ofcom’s Spectrum Usage Rights (SURs) allow 
bargaining over interference as well (Cave & Webb, 2012). Note also that IEEE-USA has called for a 
revised definition of harmful interference (http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/whitepapers/IEEEUSAWP-
HarmfulInterference0712.pdf, retrieved on 10 August 2012). 
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government spectrum might be afforded a level of predictable spectrum access (for a price) 
that might be more conduscive to investing in use of such spectrum, while still preserving 
the option for unlicensed access when that is not inconsistent with the primary and 
secondary users' needs. In this model, the secondary use looks more like a form of 
cooperative sharing arrangement (based on a contractual arrangement) and the tertiary use 
is non-cooperative. The regimes may be mixed in such ways to facilitate sharing.  
From the point of view of enforcement, the existence of subordinate rights makes it more 
difficult to determine legitimate use. In cases of subordinate rights, enforcement must 
consider the behavior of the licensee as well as the owner of the secondary usage rights, as 
either party could be subject to an enfocement proceeding. Finally, shared use might involve 
multiple rights holders with symmetric rights (e.g., co-primary, co-secondary, etc.) in an 
electrospace. Such users may rely on a mix of explicit coordination (e.g., via a beaconing 
channel that could assign time or frequency slots to manage access) or via a protocol or 
spectrum etiquette (e.g., analogous to contention based traffic management like the slow 
start mechanism in TCP). These technical solutions may be augmented by non-technical 
incentive based arrangements, such as a dispute resolution framework to resolve disputes 
over what constitutes "legal" usage when rights are ambiguous. It is not the case that 
clarifying the rights to make them more extensive and rigid (bright line) is always the 
preferred solution.24  
However, unclear rights assignments coupled to cumbersome dispute resolution 
mechanisms results in an unpredictable and costly enforcement mechanism. An advantage 
of SDR/CRs is that they have the technical capacity to include much more complicated sets 
of rules and ensure more predictable performance if the CR reasoning functionality can be 
sufficiently secured – however, with the increased complexity comes the added challenge of 
trying to anticipate all possible operating modes. The difficulty of doing that ex ante is a 
common problem of any complex system, and is not unique to DSA or software systems. 
When it is not possible to anticipate all possible bad-behavior scenarios, then the emphasis 
needs to shift from ex ante to ex post remediation: accept that problems will occur and work 
on technologies that detect and correct behaviors sooner to minimize harms. PCAST (2012) 
recognizes the importance of building trust in sharing regimes with government users and 
devotes an entire appendix to discussing the requirements of a dispute resolution 
                                                 
24  Clear property rights and dispute resolution are both complements and substitutes. Clearer 
property rights might render dispute resolution easier; but if dispute resolution is very light-weight 
and easy then it may be better to have loose property rights. The assignment of property rights can 
influence this choice. Thus, Part 15 rules simply say that Part 15 devices have no claim for 
interference protection which essentially eliminates the dispute resolution process altogether. 
Alternatively, a simple parking ticket system may tolerate a high degree of illegal parking which is 
socially optimal, and in the margin, may approach the performance of peak pricing regimes. 
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mechanism. According to PCAST (2012), such a mechanism needs to be dependable, timely, 
and efficient.  
3.3.1 COST OF ENFORCEMENT 
As noted above, Smith (2002) examines the tradeoff between enforcement cost and 
precision with respect to instutional arrangements that obtain. In general, enforcement 
becomes more costly as transmitters become mobile and the structure of usage rights 
becomes more complex. Although discussing “precision” at some length, Smith does not 
offer a succinct definition. Instead he discusses the attributes of precision, which include: 
 “Precision of property rights seems intuitive but really stands for a cluster of related 
components, making precision itself a bundle of measurable properties but not 
measurable itself” 
 “Rights are precise or specified to the extent that they protect attributes by 
preventing a range of unauthorized actions.” 
 “Precision here is an index that blends the distinguishing of attributes from one 
another and the distinguishing of levels of attributes from each other.” 
Thus precision is about the ability to exclude unauthorized or undesireable users and uses 
to a more or less fine degree. He goes on to illustrate these notions by considering (i) a 
jointly owned taxi cab and (ii) a fence around property. In the first case, Smith makes the 
case that the sharing agreement is more precise “when the benefits in loss prevention make 
it worthwhile" (e.g., gasoline usage or tire wear and tear). Costs that are coslty to measure or 
attribute (e.g., upholstery wear and tear) are defined less precisely and become a shared 
cost. In the second case, a fence around a property is a measure that prevents stealing of 
crops by virtue of blocking entry, but only imprecisely so because it also prevents a variety of 
behaviors that do not involve theft and might be otherwise benign. Increased precision could 
be obtained by employing a person to monitor boundary crossings and differentiate between 
malicious and benign uses, clearly at higher cost. 
 
In radio spectrum, more precise enforcement differentiates legitimate users and uses from 
illegitimate ones. The complexity (hence cost) of this task depends on some attributes of the 
system itself. Following Smith, the maximum practical cost of enforcement is closely linked 
to the value of the resource: as the resource becomes more valuable, the more worthwhile it 
is to invest in precise enforcement.  
If the cost of the needed precision is above the value of the resource, then the cost of bad 
behavior rationally becomes a common cost (roughly analogous to the cost of wear and tear 
on upholstery in the shared taxi example given above). In cooperative sharing, this common 
cost is a matter of negotiation and would presumably be allocated via Coasian bargaining.  
In non-cooperative sharing, the problem of common costs is more difficult. Let us begin with 
the case of non-cooperative secondary sharing. In this case, the secondary users’ usage 
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rights are subordinate to the primary users. Thus, secondary users must cede their usage 
rights to the license holder according to some algorithm, which may be determined by a third 
party (e.g., a regulator, standards organization) or through some other process (e.g., 
bargaining, interference rights). One such algorithm is that the secondary user abandons the 
channel as soon as the primary user begins transmitting. This case is typified by cognitive 
radio networks and TV whitespaces. 
Let us now consider the enforcement-related factors of this case. Ex ante, primary and 
secondary users would understand the rights hierarchy and usage transfer algorithm; the 
equipment certification process could ensure that the users’ equipment behaved according 
to those rules in some pre-defined test sequences. Ex post monitoring of primary users is 
generally a part of the secondary users’ pre-existing system (since they must execute the 
channel vacation algorithm). Generally speaking, primary users would have an incentive to 
monitor secondary users’ compliance with the channel vacation algorithm, since failure to 
do so could cause interference and could build evidence for future interference damage 
claims.  
Ideally, the enforcement regime should be sufficiently precise to at least allow the 
identification of the user who is not in full compliance, and, better still, the particular radio 
whose behavior is non-compliant (assuming that a “user” may have more than one radio). 
The cost of achieving this precision depends on many technical factors, such as the power 
of the radio being used and the air interface being used: lower power systems may be more 
difficult to detect than higher power systems, and spread spectrum systems are much more 
difficult to detect than narrowband systems.25  
The costs of enforcement may be partially recovered from the sharing parties and partially 
from third parties. For example, unlicensed devices might be subject to a certification or 
licensing fee per device, collected at the time of manufacture, which might be easier than 
trying to recover enforcement-related costs from usage-related fees, which in any case, 
would be counter to the basic idea of unlicensed (generally, free) access. In contrast, we 
might suspect that primary users might have an incentive to monitor the behavior of 
secondary users to ensure compliance on their own, and presumably, they might be required 
to pay for the superior interference protection implicit in their primary access usage rights. A 
portion of any proceeds received for the primary access (whether via auction, spectrum 
usage fees, or royalty charges) should be allocated to recovering the costs of enforcement.  
 
                                                 
25 Difficulty of detection and immunity to jamming were among the prinicple reasons why the military 
invested in the development of spread spectrum technology in the first place. 
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3.4 DSA ENFORCEMENT AND EVOLUTION 
As we discussed above, DSA is not a single regime, but a complex array of regimes, 
spanning a continuum from command & control to exclusive-use licensed to unlicensed, and 
a variations of models in between. We also argued that each regime implied different rights 
and enforcement regime. A final aspect is that any DSA regime is best described as nascent 
in the sense that: 
 The technologies used by operators are still being developed. There are early 
examples of these systems or system components (e.g., white space devices, 
cognitive radios, spectrum databases) and standards are emerging (e.g., IEEE 
P1900.x), but virtually no engineer believes that future devices will operate as 
today’s devices do. 
 The institutional arrangements between stakeholders are still emerging. Good 
regulatory approaches for the array of spectrum sharing technologies (even ones that 
have not yet been thought of) have still to be developed and analyzed. 
Even were we to favor a less complex set of regimes (say a few instead of the many we have 
today), we must recognize that spectrum reform takes a long time with a clockspeed that 
greatly lags technology and market developments. Indeed, the fact that the current regime is 
so out-of-step with current technical capabilities (DSA) and market needs (mobile broadband 
growth) is a principal driver for reform and the motivation to move to DSA models that 
enable higher-utilization and sharing of scarce spectrum resources. In the present context, 
what this means is that we perforce must live with a range of management regimes – legacy 
licenses and usage rights assignments overlap in time and market space with new reforms. 
The notion that we might transform overnight from the mix of legacy and new approaches 
we have today to a clean slate of a new and improved management regime is unrealistic. 
This is not to diminish arguments for more substantive reform, but only to suggest the small 
likelihood that they will be realized in fact. The reality seems to be that change will be slower 
and more incremental than reform advocates might like.  
Thus, evolutionary change that allows for experimentation and learning may actually be the 
optimal approach. Moving from legacy spectrum management models to a world that 
embraces sharing and DSA as the norm requires a paradigm shift – it is not an incremental 
change involving a few adjustments at the edges. Moreover, the requisite changes are not 
solely technical but require the co-evolution of business models, markets, and policy 
frameworks. Moving this ecosystem of spectrum technologies, uses, and users to the new 
paradigm will involve complex dynamics, and is more of a search problem than an 
optimization problem. We will learn as we evolve to vibrant markets for DSA. While we may 
hypothesize what models of sharing spectrum may be best for which users/uses and what 
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technologies will be most successful for realizing those market opportunities, we simply do 
not know at this stage in the evolution to DSA.  
The diversity of regimes provides us ample opportunity to experiment. The notion that we 
need to enable the potential for multiple regimes does not imply that we expect all of those 
regimes to be successful in the real world. However, enabling the diversity provides the 
opportunity for market actors to experiment and learn. The learning will be cumulative and 
we should expect that experiments in DSA in one direction will have beneficial cost and 
demand impacts in others (see Chapin & Lehr, 2007a).  
4 TOWARD THE DESIGN OF AN ENFORCEMENT REGIME FOR DSA 
The objective of this paper is to provide a framework for the design and development of 
enforcement regimes for DSA systems. An enforcement regime for DSA is necessary to 
ensure that the holders of usage rights have predictable protection of those rights. Without 
the ability to protect usage rights, usage rights holders will not be able to build systems that 
will perform in a predictable way, making investments uncertain. As we showed above, these 
usage rights are dependent on the particular mode of sharing. In this section, we would like 
to illustrate how the ideas presented in this paper might be used to develop requirements 
for an enforcement regime for a hypothetical system.  
Table 2 above shows eight general types of DSA enforcement situations and Table 3 below 
considers just the first row of that table in somewhat more detail, identifying some of the 
enforcement requirements as well as the observations about these requirements. Clearly 
system requirements become more complex as electrospace sharing and rights 
subordination come into play. Adding mobility may not change the requirements much, but 
could well increase the cost of enforcement. Institutional factors come into play as well; for 
example, usage rights subordination can occur through negotiated agreements (e.g., in the 
case of pure cooperative sharing) or through regulatory fiat (e.g. an easement for UWB 
operation below the noise floor). The origin of the subordination matters to the enforcement 
regime because negotiated subordination may include enforcement and remediation 
clauses that are contractual and would be subject to contract enforcement mechanisms 
(e.g., civil tort claim or binding arbitration, as defined by the contract). In regulatory 
subordination (e.g., TV white spaces), the locus of ex post enforcement may shift to de jure 
venues, including regulatory proceedings, as specified by the regulator.  
Above we made the case for the importance of flexibility in developing rights as well as 
enforcement regimes for DSA. Examining Table 3, it is clear that some of these 
requirements are more flexible than others. For example, a decentralized enforcement 
regime that is embedded into radios (as is possible in the shared regimes described below), 
may only be able to implement changes as quickly as radios are replaced. But the move to 
SDR/CR radios which are more readily updated may enable faster adaptation of these 
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sharing environments. Regimes based on negotiation and bargaining have more flexibility to 
adapt to technological and other environmental changes since the rules and protocols are 
not fixed. 
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Table 3 - Generic enforcement requirements of some non-mobile DSA regimes 





 Detect interference and identify bad 
actors 
 Build evidence for remediation 
 
Ex post 
 De jure process to shut down pirates 
 Negotiation with offender to stop 
interference events 
 Finding bad actors (e.g., pirate broadcasters) 
can be challenging if transmission is 
intermittent;  
 Detection and remediation may be de facto as 
well as de jure.  
 Sensing and data collection may be done in a 
decentralized way (i.e., affected party); 






 Ensure regulatory compliance of 
unlicensed devices 
 Detect and identify etiquette defectors 
 Detect other signals 
Ex post 
 Punish etiquette violators through 
protocol mechanisms 
 Shift to new electrospace to reduce 
interference 
o Unilateral action 
o Bilateral bargaining 
 
 External identification of etiquette violators is 
challenging, especially if protocols are 
complex.  
 Unlicensed bands allow many legitimate uses 
and protocols (e.g. WLAN and Zigbee and 
Bluetooth).  
 What does enforcement mean in these bands 
beyond compliance with transmitter emission 





 Detect and identify bad actors (primary 
and secondary users);  
 Build evidence for remediation (bi-
lateral) 
Ex post 
 Execute remediation procedures 
embedded in negotiated subordination 
agreement 
 Remuneration and penalties (if 
applicable) 
 Enforcement procedures must consider 
subordination agreements/policies.  





 Ensure regulatory compliance;  
 Detect and identify bad actors;  
 Detect and identify etiquette violators;  
 Build evidence for remediation;  
Ex post 
 Punish etiquette violators (protocol) 
 Seek compliance with subordination 
agreement 
 Remuneration and penalties (if 
applicable) 
 
 Subordination agreements and spectrum 
etiquette violations must be detected 
 Multiplicity of possible bad actors 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
To meet the demand from legacy and new wireless services, we will need to share our 
spectrum much more extensively than we do today. Technologies like SDR and CR are key to 
enabling the DSA systems that will share spectrum much more intensively. These DSA 
systems may be deployed in a diverse array of environments, including cooperative and non-
cooperative sharing among and between primary and secondary users. A key component of 
any sharing regime are the property rights that adhere to different classes of users and uses, 
which differ by context and band.  
This paper focuses on the enforcement challenge which is an intrinsic component of any 
property rights regime, lending force to the rights regime to constrain both ex ante behavior 
and assist in remedying harms. The enforcement regime is comprised of technical and non-
technical elements, where the latter include the business processes, market norms, and 
policy institutions and frameworks that reinforce and interact with the technical 
enforcement solutions. The emphasis in the literature on DSA enforcement has been on the 
challenges confronted specifically by SDR/CR-enabled smart radios seeking to share with 
primary users opportunistically, without causing interference for the primary users. A richer 
interpretation of the diversity of DSA frameworks recognizes that both primary and 
secondary users have property rights and obligations with respect to enforcing the 
interference management regime. It is not limited to secondary devices being required to 
avoid causing interference for primary users.  
The challenge of enforcing usage property rights is not new to spectrum management, but 
the transition to DSA systems and the commercialization of technologies like SDRs and CRs 
pose both opportunities and challenges that need to be considered when addressing the 
enforcement challenge. While the increased mobility (in geospace and waveform) of 
SDRs/CRs poses the risk of "hit-and-run" radios, these technologies also include options for 
embedding enforcement controls into the radio systems. These include things like policy 
reasoners in CRs, black boxes, and time limited leases. Moreover, these decentralized, 
edge-based solutions may be integrated with centralized and network-scale enforcement 
mechanisms like a database for registration and usage tracking (which is useful both for 
operational management and forensic diagnosis of radio behaviors, including dispute 
resolution), sensing infrastructure (that can identify spectrum holes and help detect bad 
radios), and beaconing/control channels (that can be used to support public safety 
preemption of other uses in emergencies). And, these technical solutions are supplemented 
with business practices like contracting terms and industry standards (that specify system 
designs and performance standards) and regulatory frameworks and institutions. The third-
party institutions include market researchers, arbitration services, and private and public 
"spectrum" police that may actively monitor and enforce compliance with DSA regimes. 
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Much of the enforcement apparatus – technical and non-technical – is shared across DSA 
regimes. Experiences gained in one DSA market will build competency for the extension of 
DSA functionality in other markets. For example, certain forms of CR flexibility may be 
deemed too risky to allow in general non-cooperative sharing regimes because of the 
inability to implement an effective (which also means cost-effective) enforcement 
mechanism at the current stage of development. These may be more easily deployed and 
experimented with in cooperative sharing environments; or potentially, in specific non-
cooperative sharing regimes until such time as adequate confidence in the enforcement 
mechanisms has been gained. This argues for a more holistic and adaptive view to the 
enforcement challenge.  
A key challenge to gaining this experience is to enable experimentation, especially 
operational level experimentation. As an illustrative example, consider the case of spectrum 
sharing between public safety and commercial users which is desirable for multiple reasons. 
First, the usage profiles of commercial and public safety users are sufficiently uncorrelated 
as to suggest that there would be significant white space in a regime that allocated 
spectrum exclusively to commercial uses or exclusively to public safety uses. Public safety's 
peak usage needs are likely to be different in location and time than commercial users. 
Second, future models for public safety communications anticipate the need for much 
greater interoperability and sharing between commercial and public safety users. Third, 
meeting the needs for mobile broadband of both commercial and public safety users will 
require significant investments in non-spectrum (as well as spectrum) resources. These 
costs could be lower for everyone if they could be effectively shared. While the case for 
public safety and commercial sharing is compelling, there are significant technical (public 
safety reliability and availability needs are different from commercial users), business 
(public safety is typically not-for-profit service), and regulatory (public safety is subject to 
heavy regulation) challenges to realizing such sharing. The DSA regime that may be right for 
public safety and the enforcement requirements that imposes are likely to be different than 
for commercial DSA (where contractual options are different). In keeping with the themes of 
this paper, progress toward sharing with public safety ought to be an important research 
priority and a focus for operational testing in the near future. 
Another important challenge for research in this area is to engage more multidisciplinary 
work. Designing a protocol that enables incentive-compatible, decentralized enforcement of 
efficient spectrum sharing, requires that there also be a way to ensure the protocol is 
implemented, which means paying attention to the incentive compatibility for businesses of 
investing in developing such a market and of policymakers in ensuring compliance with the 
protocol. The optimal enforcement framework involves a mix of centralized and 
decentralized, ex ante and ex post, specific and common enforcement components – and 
these must co-evolve with the technology, markets and policies as a complex ecosystem.  
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